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Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000400170013-2
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017, 697-5100

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM WRAP UP

STATION WMCA

DATE NOVEMBER 9, 1972 5:10 PM CITY NEW YORK

C I A

DAVE LEEDS: Now back to Herb Norman, sitting in for Bill Scott.

BILL SCOTT: And right now the time is ten minutes past five o'clock. Dave, before you go, sort of a rhetorical question, what do you think of when you hear the initials C.I.A.?

LEEDS: A lot of intrigue.

SCOTT: Right. Cloak and dagger. Handsome James Bond type government agents, swashbuckling through exotic locales, smashing international espionage rings, beautiful, scantily clad women reduced to putty in the hands of handsome operatives who couldn't care less.

C.I.A. Mysterious. Ingenious. Relentless. Effective. Right?

Well, maybe. And maybe not.

Patrick McGarvey, a handsome young man who does not look to be his true age, his mid-thirties, spent fourteen years in intelligence work after earning his Bachelor of Arts degree, he studied Mandarin Chinese at Yale University, then attended the C.I.A. Officer Training Program and various other training seminars in the intelligence field. Pat McGarvey spent fourteen years in intelligence and in recent years, he served in Paris, in and around the Vietnam peace talks. His credentials as an intelligence expert are, as you can see, substantial, and I haven't mentioned half of them.

Patrick McGarvey has now written a book about the Central Intelligence Agency. Its title: C.I.A.--The Myth and the Madness.

Now, as that title implies, that book is not exactly a glowing tribute to the C.I.A.

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We'll be questioning Patrick McGarvey on his impressions of such notorious incidents as, well, the Pueblo disaster, the Gulf of Tonkin Affair, and you too may question him about American intelligence, particularly the C.I.A.

Call 489-1155. But first this.

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HERB NORMAN: Pat McGarvey, first, thanks for being with us. Good to have you. Now, Pat, you are not happy with the C.I.A. as it's operated. Why?

PATRICK MC GARVEY: Well, essentially that idea is contained in the title, The Myth and The Madness. There's a popular notion afoot that C.I.A. is ten feet tall and overcapable of doing almost any act of derring-do they decide upon. When in reality, it's simply another human organization beset with all of the foibles and maybe a few more than any large organization is. Secrecy adds an additional dimension because they can hide these problems within themselves from the public.

NORMAN: James Bond is really a myth, hm?

MC GARVEY: Yah, he's long since been buried.

NORMAN: You mentioned specifically a couple of very very famous international incidents and you mentioned them with some, I suppose, bitterness, with some disappointment at the way it was handled. First, the Pueblo incident in January of 1968. That's where an American intelligence ship was picked up in waters which North Korea claimed were communist waters and it developed into a nasty international incident. What did the C.I.A. do wrong in that incident?

MC GARVEY: Well, essentially, it was the scheduling of the mission. It has never been discussed publicly by the Pentagon, but within intelligence it was documented that that mission was totally unnecessary.

Now, testimony in Capitol Hill, the Pentagon said quite the opposite. They said that it was very vital to our national security; that we know of the movements of the Soviet fleet out of the port of Vladivostok. And the Sea of Japan. That we know the daily activity of the airfields, the jet fighter fields in North Korea and that we know the deployment of the North Korean radar system.

Well, there were two land-based electronic intercepts right in Japan that told us every time they changed a roll of toilet paper on a Soviet cruiser out of the port of Vladivostok. The Air Force was flying sixty missions a month, that's two a day

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over North Korea off the coast of North Korea so they had accurate twice daily checks on the status of the MIG force on all their fighter fields and we also knew what their radar deployment was.

The last target that the Pueblo was targeted against was the naval activity out of the port of Won Thon in North Korea. Here again there was an intercept site in South Korea which adequately covered that on a daily basis.

NORMAN: So what you're saying, really is that the whole mission was unnecessary; it was a superfluous mission.

MC GARVEY: What it really is, it's a problem that we face today because we rely so heavily on technology to collect intelligence that we have the assets, we have the resources to collect information, so therefore, simply because we have them, we employ them.

And without any real rational design or purpose behind them.

NORMAN: Out of that Pueblo incident -- it was a disaster, a couple of men were killed and a couple of careers were ruined; it was quite a costly mistake, if indeed, mistake it was. Will the government now admit what you're suggesting, that it was -- or is that too rash an admission for a government to have to make?

MC GARVEY: I don't know whether they would admit it or not. Another aspect is that annoys me about the Pueblo incident is not so much what they told the American public. What they told the public about the incident was essentially correct. The only thing is there were things that they did not tell the American public. One of which was that on four occasions three days prior to the seizure of the Pueblo, the Pueblo had, in fact, violated North Korean territorial waters.

Now this was documented by radar trackings. That were gone over after the seizure. If there was seized(?).

NORMAN: Pat, more questions, in just a minute. If you'd like to question Pat McGarvey, the number to call is 489-1155. We're talking about the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency which Pat McGarvey feels needs a good deal of work.

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NORMAN: Our guest, Pat McGarvey, author of: CIA--The Myth and The Madness. The subject of the book is very much what the title implies, that the CIA, there are some mythical things about the CIA that perhaps public relations people built up but that Pat McGarvey our guest does not necessarily feel are the absolute truth.

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You're on the air with Pat McGarvey. Go ahead.

CALLER: Hello, Mr. McGarvey.

MCGARVEY: Yes.

CALLER: I'm very concerned, as is everybody about our drug problem and you no doubt know that there have been reports about the extensive traffic from the Indochinas (sic) -- Laos and Thailand and that the CIA was fully aware of it, in fact, they covered up or did not admit that they were aware of the fact that some shipments which were alleged to have been removed or that is shipped out of Thailand actually were manure. Can you comment on that, please?

MC GARVEY: I can't comment on the manure aspect ...

CALLER: Can you comment on the drug situation and the C.I.A.'s role?

MC GARVEY: I have no first hand knowledge from my own experiences when I served in South Vietnam of C.I.A. actually involved in the drug traffic. However, it was one of those things everybody knows -- when I was in South Vietnam that the Agency knew that it was going on.

But one thing that people I think should keep in mind about this business is that during the late 50s and early 60s, the American government was branded as being missionaries under the influence of John Foster Dulles, going around the world, trying to sell the American way. The result when John Kennedy came in was a change in attitude, that we're not to go around sermonizing, we're to accept the world as it really is and one facet of that is that it was determined that the American government had to work with Laotian, Thai, and South Vietnamese officials whose lifestyle did not necessarily coincide with ours, whose moral attitudes were considerably different than ours, and who are we to go around changing those attitudes?

Now, in a sense, we were aiding and abetting perhaps in the flow of drugs in that area of the world.

NORMAN: One of the - we have some more calls - while I'm thinking of this, though, I'd like to get this in -- one of the most far reaching incidents in recent American history was the Gulf of Tonkin Affair, actually it may have been the basis for our mass influx of troops into Vietnam of American troops. What part did the C.I.A. play in that?

MC GARVEY: Well, the part that intelligence played in that was simply passing along the operational reporting of the U.S. Seventh Fleet elements that were involved in the alleged

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incident where we were supposedly attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats. The evidence that we saw did not indicate that they had actually in fact attacked our boats. The operation reports indicated that it was just an overzealous sonar man who was reading echoes of his own engine turbines, rather than reading the attacking PT boats.

NORMAN: It's a pretty grave charge, isn't it, against an agency -- what you're suggesting now?

MC GARVEY: Well, what the Agency did, in that specific instance. They didn't editorialize on the nature of the evidence; they simply passed the evidence along to the President and the fellow who gave the briefing at the White House was a friend of mine, told me, his marching words when he went over there were, don't editorialize, don't qualify the kind of evidence, let the President make that decision. And of course he made a horseback judgment to bomb North Vietnam.

NORMAN: All right, if you have any questions of our guest, Patrick McGarvey who is the author of C.I.A.--The Myth and The Madness, published by the Saturday Review Press, the number to call is 489-1155. The subject: CIA. Central Intelligence Agency.

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NORMAN: Pat McGarvey is our guest, the author of The C.I.A.--The Myth and The Madness, published by Saturday Review Press.

Pat, you mention also that agents, C.I.A. agents, and I suppose this would go for most intelligence agents are not dedicated anticommunists as we would be led to believe, that at times, they would trade in this job for something that's a little more profitable for them. How about that?

MC GARVEY: Well, right, essentially - let me clarify; let me define what the word agent is. An agent is not an American employee of C.I.A., but rather is a person living in a foreign country whom we recruit. The American element of that, these guys are called case officers, they go out and recruit an actual agent who goes back and steals information from files and things like that.

NORMAN: The American employee of the C.I.A. would be the case officer?

MC GARVEY: The case officer is the standard term applied to him.

NORMAN: Were you a case officer?

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MC GARVEY: Yes.

NORMAN: For how long?

MC GARVEY: Approximately a year and a half in the field.

What an agent, well, what a case officer looks for in potential agents, is the human weaknesses. If he's got a propensity for the painted ladies, or he likes the sauce a little too much, or he's a little too far into debt, the agent makes him a deal he can't turn down.

NORMAN: He can't refuse.

MC GARVEY: That's right.

NORMAN: It's not exactly, well, it's not exactly clean work is it?

MC GARVEY: Well, one of the first things they told us in our training program there was intelligence was a dirty business and it sure as hell is.

NORMAN: And you were in various fields of intelligence, hasn't bothered you?

MC GARVEY: Well, it bothered me, I ended up with an ulcer and five operations ...

NORMAN: So you wrote a book.

MC GARVEY: That's right. I'm minus a stomach and some footage of my intestines as a result of that.

NORMAN: It very obviously did bother you.

MC GARVEY: Got under my skin.

NORMAN: You wouldn't want to go back to it.

MC GARVEY: No way.

NORMAN: Let's take another call.

You're on the air.

CALLER: Yes. Two questions I have. One. At the beginning of the C.I.A., I understand that a person has to be -- although there were a certain amount of German citizens right after the war, I mean, around in '49, '50, thirty-seven or some amount of German citizens that were taken into the CIA and one had to be a third generation American in order to join the C.I.A.

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[CROSS TALK]

CALLER: The other thing I wanted to know is - when I was in service (UNCLEAR) ... where there was a C.I.A. station and there was also B.I.A., A.I.A., and other initials I can't remember and I wondered what they stood for?

MC GARVEY: Well, let's go to your first question. The C.I.A. runs a security background check on everybody that goes to work there and the one thing they look for of anybody of European or Asian or any other ancestry is whether or not they have any relatives currently living in that country that could be used as a lever or a handle against them. In other words, if you were of Polish extraction and you had grandparents or someone like that living in Poland now, the C.I.A. wouldn't touch you with a ten foot pole because obviously if they ever found it out, five year from now, it would be your grandmother's life in Warsaw or play ball with the opposition. You can understand that situation.

CALLER: I saw them on the bus (UNCLEAR) -- and I noticed that there was like a separation in them, they were like, there were some people like middle European people that were working, but they'd seem to have a separate existence; they didn't have like these smart dressing style and like the certain elegance ...

MC GARVEY: The typical good CIA operative overseas -- it's a little gray man that you see on the bus everyday but you couldn't describe him if you tried to. He's just an innocuous ... (OVERTALK) ...

CALLER: I've seen a lot of people that -- with geodetic survey that I wondered of, you know, how they kept time(?) to survey?

MC GARVEY: Well, sure all those cover names overseas are a little ridiculous.

I was a member of the Naval Auxiliary Communications Center at one time, a member of the U.S. AID mission at another time.

NORMAN: Pat -- thank you for your call -- Pat, when you were members of those things, what specifically were you doing without giving away any big secrets, I mean, you were ...

MC GARVEY: In Vietnam, for example, we were working with the South Vietnamese police at the province level, establishing what later became the Phoenix program, we were helping them set up a system whereby they would recruit two informants in every hamlet in every village in the province; the informants

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would build -- start reporting on the activities of everyone in the hamlet, and files and dossiers were built, then we tried to show them how to analyze these reports and after a period of time, ringers would start showing up, guys who were getting cozy with the VC, one way or another, would start showing up in this reporting system, and this, of course, was sort of a backbone for what turned into that political assassination program.

NORMAN: Let's see if we can get another call in here.

You're on the air. Go ahead.

CALLER: Yes. I'd like to know; what is the nature of the other part of the CIA? In other words, what you've described seems to be the glamour work. But how the (CROSS TALK) ... analysis officers, the data processing, et cetera.

MC GARVEY: ... bulk of the book. The majority - the major portion of my book is devoted to this aspect of it. I say this is where the myth resides, that people have this notion that CIAs were swirling around the world, creating all sorts of political havoc, when in reality it's a muddlesome, giant bureaucratic nightmare of analysts and data processing people and clerks and that sort of thing.

NORMAN: Pat, one last question, I - from what I can get from your book, you really don't believe that the C.I.A. should be eliminated.

MC GARVEY: ... no ...

NORMAN: ... you think that there is a need for an organization like that. Like this. What should be done. What in your mind, if you could suddenly have full control over it, what would you do to clean up the C.I.A., as it were?

MC GARVEY: The first thing I'd strip away, about eighty-five percent of that veil of secrecy; there's obviously a need for secrecy in intelligence, but not to the extent that we have, the budget doesn't have to be secret; Congress should know why and how we're spending intelligence money. The public should know what's going on essentially in the intelligence community to an extent.

The only thing that should be protected by classification stamps are sources of information that-- where lives are involved or where great expense is involved.

NORMAN: Okay, Pat McGarvey, author of The C.I.A.--The Myth and The Madness, published by Saturday Review Press. Thank you for being with us.